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Congressional Hearing Held on
Orbital Debris and Space Traffic
In response to the accidental collision of the
Iridium 33 and Cosmos 2251 satellites in February,
a Congressional hearing was held on 28 April on the
subject of “Keeping the Space Environment Safe
for Civil and Commercial Users.” Appearing before
the House Committee on Science and Technology’s
Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics were
Lt Gen Larry James of US Strategic Command,
Nicholas Johnson of NASA’s Orbital Debris
Program Office, Richard Dalbello of Intelsat
General Corporation, and Scott Pace of George
Washington University’s Space Policy Institute.
Subcommittee members questioned the witnesses
about potential measures to improve the information
available to civil and commercial users to avoid in-
space collisions and discussed ways to minimize the
growth of future space debris.
In his statement before the Subcommittee,
Johnson noted that “The recent collision of two
intact satellites underscores a NASA 1970s-era
finding, reiterated more recently in a NASA study
published in Science in 2006, that the amount of
debris already in Earth orbit is sufficient to lead to
more accidental collisions, which in turn will lead to
an unintended increase in space debris and increased
risk to operational space systems. In the future, such
collisions are likely to be the principal source of new
space debris. The most effective means of limiting
satellite collisions is to remove non-functional
spacecraft and launch vehicle orbital stages from
orbit.”
Just five days before the Congressional hearing,
NASA’s Cloudsat spacecraft executed a collision
avoidance maneuver to evade a potential collision
with a fragment of Cosmos 2251.
Subcommittee Chairwoman Gabrielle
Giffords (D-AZ) summarized the hearing,
saying, “One thing is already clear – the space
environment is getting increasingly crowded
due to the relentless growth of space debris. If
the spacefaring nations of the world don’t take
steps to minimize the growth of space junk, we
may eventually face a situation where low Earth
orbit becomes a risky place to carry out civil and
commercial space activities.” ♦
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Figure 1. Witnesses appearing before Congressional hearing
on orbital debris. From left to right, Lt Gen Larry James of
US Strategic Command, Nicholas Johnson of NASA’s
Orbital Debris Program Office, Richard Dalbello of Intelsat
General Corporation, and Scott Pace of George Washington
University’s Space Policy Institute.
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20090027660 2019-08-30T07:37:28+00:00Z
Figure 1. A view of the HST after it was captured and locked to the Atlantis cargo bay. (NASA Photo/s125e007066)
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United Nations’ COPUOS Receives Update on
Iridium-Cosmos Collision
At its annual meeting in June, in Vienna,
Austria, the United Nations’ Committee on
the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS)
received two updates from the United States
on the February collision of the Iridium 33
and Cosmos 2251 satellites. Former astronaut
and current Air Force Brigadier General Susan
Helms noted that US Strategic Command is
developing a capability to conduct conjunction
assessments for a larger number of operational
spacecraft and is looking forward to expanding
its spaceflight safety products to the
international aerospace community. Nicholas
Johnson, of the NASA Orbital Debris Program
Office, provided a technical update on the
nature of the collision debris clouds and their
likely evolution.
More than 1500 large (> 10 cm) debris
from the collision had been identified by the US
Space Surveillance Network. These debris are
concentrated near 800 km altitude where a large
number of spacecraft perform communications
and Earth observation missions.
The Cosmos 2251 debris outnumbered the
Iridium 33 debris by about two-to-one, close to
the ratio of their respective masses. Assuming
a rapid return to normal levels of solar activity,
half of the debris (principally those debris
ejected in retrograde directions) might fall back
to Earth within 5 years, although some will
remain in orbit through the end of the century.
However, if solar activity remains at low levels,
as now predicted by many solar scientists, the
debris could remain in orbit for significantly
longer periods. ♦
MMOD Inspection of the HST Wide Field Planetary
Camera 2 Radiator
The STS-125 Atlantis astronauts retrieved
the Hubble Space Telescope (HST) Wide Field
Planetary Camera 2 (WFPC2) during a very
successful and final servicing mission to the
HST in May. The radiator attached to WFPC2
(Figure 1) has a dimension of 2.2 m by 0.8 m.
Its outermost layer is a 4-mm thick
aluminum coated with white thermal
paint. This radiator has been exposed
to space since the deployment of
WFPC2 in 1993. Due to its large
surface area and long exposure time,
the radiator serves as a unique witness
plate for the micrometeoroid and
orbital debris (MMOD) environment
between 560 and 620 km altitude.
The NASA Orbital Debris
Program Office is leading an effort,
with full support from the NASA
Hypervelocity Impact Technology
Facility, NASA Meteoroid
Environment Office, and NASA
Curation Office, to conduct an
MMOD impact survey of the
WFPC2 radiator during the summer.
The goal is to use the data to validate
or improve the near-Earth MMOD
environment definition. This effort
is also very well supported by the
HST Program located at the NASA
Goddard Space Flight Center. From
the on-orbit images taken during the
last two servicing missions, 20 large MMOD
impacts are clearly visible (Figure 2). The survey
team expects to find an additional 600 to 1000
impact craters caused by MMOD particles in
the size regime that are important to satellite
impact risk assessments. As the project moves
forward, more information will be reported in
the Orbital Debris Quarterly News. ♦
continued on page 3
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continued on page 4	 Figure 1. GPM Spacecraft with deployed solar arrays.
satellite operation
through NASA’s
Goddard Space Flight
Center (GSFC).
JAXA is providing
the Dual-frequency
Precipitation Radar
(DPR) with Ku/
Ka-bands (13.6 and
35.5 GHz), the H-IIA
launch vehicle, and
launch operation
services.
A sketch of
the GPM spacecraft
in Figure 1 shows
the locations of
the DPR (labeled
separately as KuPR
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MMOD Inspection
continued from page 2
Figure 2. Large, visible MMOD impacts on the WFPC2 radiator. The largest damage area is about 1 cm across. Red circles: features identified from the 2002 HST
Servicing Mission 3B image survey. Green circles: new features identified from the 2009 HST Servicing Mission 4 image survey. (NASA Photo/s125e006995)
PROJECT REVIEWS
Reentry Survivability Analysis of the
Global Precipitation Measurement Spacecraft
R. L. KELLEY
The Global Precipitation Measurement
(GPM) spacecraft is part of a joint NASA/
Japanese Aerospace Exploration Agency
(JAXA) project, planned to be launched in
2013. From the beginning, the project team’s
goal was to design the vehicle to reduce the
risk of human casualty following reentry by
reducing spacecraft component survivability
and/or by executing a controlled reentry.
The NASA Orbital Debris Program Office
recently performed a reentry survivability
analysis for the entire GPM spacecraft.
Because of several large components within
the spacecraft, a detailed analysis was needed
to assess compliance with NASA Standard
8719.14. GPM is being launched as a follow-
on to the Tropical Rainfall Measuring Mission
(TRMM) spacecraft, orbited in 1997. NASA’s
contribution includes the spacecraft bus and
GPM Microwave Imager (GMI), as well as
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Figure 2. Demise altitude versus downrange for all GPM components.
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Reentry Survivability
continued from page 3
and KaPR), the high gain antenna (HGAS),
the GMI, and the avionics. The GPM
spacecraft will be launched into a 400 km,
65º
 circular orbit to meet the objective of
measuring the amount and distribution of
rainfall for over 80% of the globe. The data
acquired by the satellite will be used to predict
global climatic changes.
In order to ensure vehicle compliance with
NS 8719.14, specifically Requirement 4.7-1
regarding reentry survivability, the GPM team
from the beginning adopted a “Design for
Demise” mind-set. To this end, debris casualty
area (DCA) goals were allotted for each
subsystem in much the same way that typical
satellite design teams assign mass and power
allotments. This added constraint on the design
of the vehicle has resulted in numerous studies
to help assess the survivability for various
individual components. The design team used
these assessments for items such as fuel tanks
and reaction wheel assemblies, both of which
typically survive, to identify alternate component
designs which would be more likely to demise.
In addition to the analysis performed on
individual components, multiple iterations of
the entire spacecraft analysis were performed as
details of the design were refined. The ultimate
goal of the project is to satisfy the requirement
of NS 8719.14, which states that the risk to
human casualty will not exceed 1:10 000.
All analyses for GPM were performed
using NASA‘s Object Reentry Survivability
Analysis Tool (ORSAT), with the most recent
and most complete analysis containing 255
objects, representing over 85% of the total
mass of the spacecraft. At the time of this latest
analysis, a design decision concerning whether
the propellant management device (PMD)
should be made of aluminum or titanium was
pending; therefore, the results of both scenarios
were modeled.
The assumptions in the analysis of GPM
included an uncontrolled reentry starting at
122 km, the accepted altitude for entry interface.
At 78 km the main spacecraft body was assumed
to break up and the primary components were
assumed to split from the parent body and
enter separately. Further fragmentation of these
components occurred in a number of cases.
In its entirety, GPM was assumed to have
a mass of 2676 kg with box-like dimensions
of length = 4.28 m, width = 2.54 m and
height = 2.39 m. Other assumptions included an
initial temperature of 300 K for all components
and an average oxidation efficiency factor of 0.5.
In cases where the object survived with a high
demise factor (absorbed heat divided by heat
of ablation) of over 90%, a parametric analysis
was considered in which the initial temperature
and oxidation efficiency were varied from the
nominal values.
Fourteen different materials were used in
the analysis for the 255 unique components. In
ORSAT, the point of object demise is assessed
to occur once the total heat absorbed (net
heating rate integrated over time, multiplied by
the surface area) becomes greater then the heat
of ablation of the object.
The final results showed 26 and 32 unique
objects (93 and 99 including duplicate objects)
surviving for the cases of the aluminum
PMD and the titanium PMD, respectively, the
difference being the six components which
make up the PMD. When only the items with
an impact energy greater than 15 J, the accepted
hazard limit for impacting debris, are considered,
only 15 of the unique components (30 including
duplicate objects) for the aluminum PMD case
contribute to the DCA of the GPM spacecraft.
For the titanium PMD case, 21 of the unique
components (36 including duplicate objects)
survived with an impact energy of greater than
15 J.
Figure 2 shows the demise altitude vs.
downrange for all of the GPM components
modeled for the titanium PMD scenario. With
the exception of a few components that have
extreme ballistic coefficients, there is a near
linear variation of demise altitude vs. downrange.
All surviving components, regardless of impact
energy, are shown in this figure with those items
with a DCA greater than 15 J highlighted in
yellow and PMD components highlighted in
red. If the items with impact energies less than
15 J are ignored, the first object contributing to
the DCA is located at a downrange distance of
18 473 km and the last is located at 19 740 km,
resulting in a footprint length of 1267 km. Since
all of the surviving titanium PMD components
fall within these bounds, the footprint of the
aluminum PMD case is identical. The total
surviving mass is 75.9 kg or 2.8% of the total
for the aluminum PMD scenario and 82.6 kg or
3.1 % for the titanium PMD. The result is a DCA
of 23.38 m2 for the aluminum and 26.71 m2 for
the titanium PMD case. Depending on the year
of reentry, this risk is approximately 1:3500
– 1:2800 depending on the case. As a result of
these findings, the GPM project has selected
a controlled reentry as the primary means of
disposal. ♦
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Table 1. A summary of recent major breakups (based on the 25 June 2009 catalog data).
Number ofNumber ofTotal CatalogedEvent CatalogedEvent Cause Cataloged FragmentsTime Fragment Fragments with RemaininRCS data In Orbit
g
Fengyun-1C Jan 2007 Collision (deliberate) 2529 2529 2479
Briz-M Feb 2007 Explosion 76 76 74
Cosmos 2421 Mar 2008 Unknown 509 508 41
Iridium 33 Feb 2009 Collision (accidental) 336 327 323
Cosmos 2251 Feb 2009 Collision (accidental) 795 789 773
*some tracked objects have not been added to the catalog.
Figure 1. Cumulative size distributions of the four major breakup fragment clouds since 2007.
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An Update on Recent Major Breakup Fragments
J.-C. LIOU
Of the 190 known satellite breakups
between 1961 and 2006, only one generated
more than 500 cataloged fragments. The
event was the explosion of the Pegasus
Hydrazine Auxiliary Propulsion System
(HAPS, International Designator 1994-029B,
US Satellite Number 23106) in 1996. A total
of 713 Pegasus HAPS fragments were included
in the catalog. 1
 Since the beginning of 2007,
however, the near-Earth environment has been
subjected to several major breakups. Table 1 lists
the basic information of the breakups, including
the cataloged fragments, fragments with Radar
Cross Section (RCS) measurements, and the
number of cataloged fragments remaining
in orbit (as of 25 June 2009). The long-term
impact of these events to the environment
depends on several factors – number of
fragments generated, orbital lifetimes of the
fragments, and collision probabilities with
respect to other objects in the environment.
This article provides an update summary of
the first two factors, based on the 25 June 2008
catalog data.
Leading the list of Table 1 is the
Fengyun-1C (FY-1C) anti-satellite test
conducted by China on 11 January 2007. It
was the worst on-orbit breakup in history and
the damage to the environment is severe. 2,3
The explosion of Briz-M generated perhaps
more than 1000 detectable fragments (ODQN,
April 2007, p 3). However, due to the availability
and sensor location limitation of the US Space
Surveillance Network (SSN), only 76 fragments
are included in the catalog. The cause of the
multiple fragmentation events of Cosmos 2421
remains unknown (ODQN, July 2008, pp 1-2).
Fortunately, it is the only member of its class
still in orbit and the majority of the fragments,
as of June 2009, have decayed. The first
ever accidental collision between two intact
satellites, Iridium 33 and Cosmos 2251 (560
kg and 900 kg, respectively), highlighted the
orbital debris problem in the low Earth orbit
(LEO) region. Its long-term impact to the
environment will need to be assessed once the
data collection is complete.
Figure 1 shows the cumulative size
distributions of the four major fragment
clouds. The NASA Size Estimation Model
was used to convert the observed RCS to the
average size of each object. 4 The curves exhibit
a similar pattern – a power law distribution
consistent with the common understanding of
the size distribution of explosion or collision
fragments. However, the slopes are somewhat
different. The level-off of the curves near
10 cm is similar to those of other fragment
populations in the environment. 3 It is caused by
the sensitivity limit of the SSN sensors.
The orbital lifetime of an object is related
to its area-to-mass ratio (A/m) and the perigee
and apogee altitudes of its orbit. The A/m of
each fragment was empirically determined from
its TLE history. An iterative curve-fit routine,
including orbit propagation based on actual
daily solar flux record, was applied to the TLE
history until an A/m value converged to fit the
data. At the end of the data processing, good
A/M solutions were obtained for the majority
of the fragments. Figure 2 shows the size
versus A/m distributions of the four fragment
clouds. Objects with an A/m close to or above
_1 m2/kg are probably multi-layer insulation
(MLI) pieces. Objects with an A/m between
—0.2 to —1 m2/kg are likely to be made of a
honeycomb of composite materials. Objects
with an A/m below —0.2 m 2/kg are consistent
with heavy metal-like debris.
The distribution of the FY-1C fragments
indicates a complete fragmentation of the
vehicle and many debris originated from possibly
the MLIs, the two large solar panels (1.5 m ×
4 m each), and other plastic components. The
distribution of the Cosmos 2251 fragments
also shows various components in the mix.
continued on page 6
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The distribution of the Iridium 33 fragments,
however, is more unusual. The lack of metal-like
fragments could be a reflection of the extensive
usage of lightweight composite materials for
the construction of the satellite. 5 Many of the
fragments may also originate from the two
solar arrays (3.9 m2 each) and/or the three main
mission antennas (1.6 m2 each). Spectroscopic
observations on some of the fragments might
provide additional insight on their origins.
1. Johnson, N. et al., History of on-orbit
satellite fragmentations, 14 th edition, NASA/
TM–2008–214779, 2008.
2. Johnson, N. et al., The characteristics
and consequences of the break-up of the Fengyun-1C
spacecraft, Acta Astronautica 63, 128-135, 2008.
3. Liou, J.-C. and Johnson, N.,
Characterization of the cataloged Fengyun-1C fragments
and their long-term effect on the LEO environment,
Adv. Space Res. 43, 1407-1415, 2009.
4. Settecerri, T. et al., Radar measurements
of the orbital debris environment: Haystack and HAX
radars October 1990 – October 1998, JSC-28744,
1999.
5. Garrison, T. et al., System engineering
trades for the Iridium constellation, J. Spacecraft
& Rockets 34, 675-680, 1997. ♦
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Figure 2. Area-to-mass (A/m) ratio versus size distributions of the four major fragment clouds.
Visit the NASA Orbital Debris Program Office Website
www.orbitaldebris.jsc.nasa.gov
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UPCOMING MEETINGS
12-16 October 2009: The 60th International	 1-4 September 2009: Advanced Maui Optical
Astronautical Congress (IAC), Daejeon, 	 and Space Surveillance Technology (AMOS)
Republic of Korea	 Conference, Maui, Hawaii, USA
The theme of the 2009 IAC is “Space for Sustainable
Peace and Progress.” A total of five sessions are planned for the
Space Debris Symposium. The subjects of the sessions include
measurements and space surveillance, modeling and risk analysis,
hypervelocity impacts and protection, and mitigation and standards.
Additional information on the 2009 IAC is available at <http://
www.iac2009.kr/>.
The 10th annual AMOS Conference will continue to focus
on space surveillance. Three sessions are planned for orbital
debris, Iridium/Cosmos collision, and space situational awareness.
Additional information on the conference is available at <http://
www.amostech.com>.
Current Debris Environment in Low Earth Orbit
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SATELLITE BOX SCO
(as of 01 July 2009, as cataloged
U.S. SPACE SURVEILLANCE NETWO
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by the
RK)
Country/ Rocket
Organization Payloads Bodies Total& Debris
CHINA 77 2855 2932
CIS 1381 3637 5018
ESA 39 36 75
FRANCE 49 410 459
INDIA 36 115 151
JAPAN 114 71 185
USA 1101 3449 4550
OTHER 429 98 527
TOTAL 3226 10671 13897
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Correspondence concerning the
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Debi Shoots
NASA Johnson Space Center
Orbital Debris Program Office
Mail Code JE104
Houston, TX 77058
debra.d.shoots@nasa.gov
DAS 2.0 NOTICE
Attention DAS 2.0 Users:
An updated solar flux table is
available for use with DAS 2.0.
Please go to the Orbital Debris
Website (http://www.orbitaldebris.
jsc.nasa.gov/mitigate/das.html)
 to
download the updated table and
subscribe for email alerts of future
updates.
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center
2101 NASA Parkway
Houston, TX 77058
www.nasa.gov
INTERNATIONAL SPACE MISSIONS
01 April – 30 June 2009
Perigee Apogee Earth OtherInternational Country/ Inclination OrbitalPayloads Altitude Altitude CatalogedDesignator Organization (DEG) Rocket
ebrisD(KM) (KM) Bodies
2009-001A USA 202 USA NO ELEMS. AVAILABLE 1 0
2009-002A GOSAT JAPAN 668 670 98.0 1 2
2009-002B PRISM JAPAN 612 642 98.0
2009-002C SDS-1 JAPAN 662 668 98.0
2009-002D OBJECT D JAPAN 655 666 98.0
2009-002E OBJECT E JAPAN 658 668 98.0
2009-002F OBJECT F JAPAN 667 671 98.0
2009-002G STARS JAPAN 648 666 98.0
2009-002H KKS-1 JAPAN 652 666 98.0
2009-003A KORONAS-FOTON RUSSIA 539 562 82.5 1 0
2009-004A OMID IRAN 245 378 55.5 1 0
2009-005A NOAA 19 USA 845 867 98.7 1 0
2009-006A PROGRESS-M 66 RUSSIA 348 360 51.6 1 0
2009-007A EXPRESS AM-44 RUSSIA 35774 35800 0.1 1 1
2009-007B EXPRESS MD1 RUSSIA 35783 35790 0.1
NETHER-2009-008A NSS 9 35778 35794 0.0 1 1LANDS
2009-008B HOT BIRD 10 EUTELSAT 35783 35791 0.1
2009-008C SPIRALE A FRANCE 621 35703 1.9
2009-008D SPIRALE B FRANCE 630 35694 1.9
2009-009A TELSTAR 1 1N CANADA 35782 35791 0.0 1 0
2009-01 0A RADUGA 1-8 RUSSIA 35614 35946 1.4 2 3
2009-011A KEPLER USA HELIOCENTRIC 1 1
2009-012A STS 119 USA 335 353 51.6 0 0
2009-013A GOCE ESA 271 288 96.7 1 0
2009-014A NAVSTAR 63 (USA 203) USA 20025 20089 55.0 2 0
2009-015A SOYUZ-TMA 14 RUSSIA 347 360 51.6 1 0
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